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Automobile Liability Insurance
System: Proposals for
Pragmatic Reform
By WLLIAM T. CAHILL*
The importance of insurance to America's social and economic
life is difficult to overstate. By providing compensation for per-
sonal and business losses, insurance has brought stability to the
nation's economy and confidence to the American public.
However, because of its commanding importance to the public
interest, I am convinced that the insurance industry must be sub-
jected to some degree of governmental regulation. Moreover, it
is clear that the legislative search for an optimally effective system
of insurance regulation is not an easy quest. Like care for the
elderly and job opportunities for our young, the public's need
for insurance presents complex social problems which must be
resolved in accordance with modem realities.
Perhaps no other area of the present insurance industry better
illustrates the continuing need to adjust public regulation to meet
changed social and economic conditions than automobile liability
insurance. Certainly, no other form of modern insurance has
generated such tremendous concern on the part of the Bar, the
insurance industry and representatives of government. Certainly,
no other form of modern insurance presents such an urgent de-
mand for regulatory reform.
The conditions leading to universal agreement that a crisis
does indeed exist in the automobile liability insurance system
have been widely discussed. In short, the major causes of our
present national concern are the following:
First, the cost of automobile liability insurance to the con-
sumer has soared during the past few years. Nationwide average
* United States Representative, 6th District, New Jersey; Member, House
Judiciary Committee, Joint Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy.
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premium rates for "regular" liability coverage have increased a
staggering fifty-five percent during the past decade.1 Moreover,
disproportionate rate increases in urban and other areas of the
country have made it increasingly difficult for motorists in those
areas to afford insurance protection.
Secondly, arbitrary and selective risk classification practices of
the insurance industry have developed tremendous public hosti-
lity towards the industry. Constituent complaints to members of
the U. S. Congress and state legislatures reveal numerous instances
where the elderly, the young, and members of minority groups
have had their policies cancelled or otherwise terminated for
reasons unrelated to individual driving abilities.
Thirdly, during the past ten years, over one hunderd in-
surance companies writing automobile liability coverage have be-
come insolvent. It is estimated that some three thousand policy
holders and accident victims now hold pending claims in excess of
one-half billion dollars against total assets of insolvent companies
amounting to less than 25 million dollars.2
Fourthly, inequitable delays in payment of loss compensation
to accident victims have become characteristic of the present
system. Protracted settlement negotiations and congested court
dockets generally require an injured claimant to wait from two
to six years before compensation is obtained.
Recent congressional examination3 of these crisis conditions
reveals that they are not isolated or unrelated social problems.
Rather, it has become clear that they are symptomatic of funda-
mental defects in the over-all automobile insurance system. As
stated by a recent House Judiciary Committee staff report: "By
any objective standard the performance of the automobile in-
surance business in the United States is unsatisfactory. The sys-
I See generally STAFF REPORT OF T=E AiTI-TUsT Suncomn. oF THE HOUsE
COMMl. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG. 1ST S-sS. (Sept 30, 1967) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF REPORT].2 Hearings on S. 3919 Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Anti-Trust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 978
(1967).3 For a development of recent Congressional interest in the automobile in-
surance problem, see Cahill, A Call For Public Dialog: Auto Insurance, 114
CONG. REc. E. 595 (daily ed. Feb. 7 1968). See also Hearings on S. ties. 129
Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 90th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1968); STAFF OF ANn-TusT SuBcomnm. OF HousE JUDICIARY Cozsi.,
90TH CoNG., REPORT 815; Hearings On the Insurance Industry Before the Sub-
comm. on Anti-Trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th-
91st Cong., 2nd & 1st Sess. (1968-1969).
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tern is slow and expensive and the companies involved do a poor
job".4
The term "automobile insurance system," however, must be
understood in its broadest sense.5 Basically this "system!' provides
protection against the risk that an individual will negligently
cause an accident that injures another person or damages another's
property. Because of its social importance, the form, cost and dis-
tribution of this protection is regulated by Federal and State
governments.
In view of the comprehensive nature of the insurance system,
this writer is convinced that legislative and industry reform efforts
must be directed to two major areas:
The first requires a pragmatic examination of the tort
principles which make accident compensation contingent upon
the claimant's ability to establish "negligence" in adversary judi-
cial proceedings. Court dockets congested by minor accident
claims, inadequate judicial and administrative facilities and man-
power, impracticable rules of evidence and pretrial proceedings,
outmoded settlement techniques, restrictive applications of the
doctrine of contributory negligence, and other practical aspects of
the existing negligence compensation system present possible sub-
jects for reform.6 However, in my judgment, it is unlikely that
the Congress or state legislatures7 will find sufficient cause in these
troubled areas to abolish tort doctrines of compensation in favor
of a no-fault plan.
Apart from the powerful opposition of groups which have a
vested interest in the negligence system, enactment of a no-fault
plan involves many far reaching policy decisions.
Is a system which places the cost of motor vehicle ac-
cidents on "innocent" or "good" drivers either desirable or ac-
ceptable to the American public?
4 STAI REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.5 For a discussion of the confusion that has developed over the use of the
term "system", see House Debate On S. Res. 129, 114 CONG. ltc. 3416 (1968).
GAMnmuc BAR ASSOCrATION, REPoRT OF =z SPECIAL CoMMTr-E AUTo-
MoBILE AccmmE REPAnrTONS (1969).7 Massachusetts has had unfortunate legislative experience with the plan.
In 1967, the lower house of the legislature passed a variation of the widely dis-
cussed Keeton-O'Connell No-Fault Plan. Press reports which publicized the bill
as a complete answer to the states insurance woes generated public pressure for
the plans enactment. However, with the discovery of major defects in the plan
at the last moment, the senate rejected the bill.
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Would such a system involve cost, savings or merely re-
distribute the responsibility for accident compensation?
Would such a system adequately evaluate claims for
serious personal injuries and pain and suffering or, conversely,
would it promote fraudulent applications for payment?
Would a no-fault plan administered by the private in-
surance industry solve existing problems of insurer in-
solvencies, high premium rates and restrictive underwriting
practice?
These issues undoubtedly will take years of research and de-
bate to resolve definitively. In view of the present national con-
cern with insurance industry conditions, it can be anticipated
that legislatures will concern themselves with immediate improve-
ments in the existing compensation system rather than engage
primarily in costly experimentation and academic speculation.
The second major area of the present system which calls for
urgent reform is the insurance industry's regulatory and rate
making structure.
In my judgment, it is in this area, which is barely perceived
by the general public, that answers to the following important
questions will be found:
Why are so many automobile liability policies terminated
without apparent reason?
Why is the so-called high risk market and the assigned
risk population constantly growing in an industry which
speaks glowingly of competition?
Can true competition prevail when the buyer must have
the product?
Are premium rates determined by the experience policy
holders create, by subjective industry judgments, or by the
calculations of actuaries rationalizing predetermined rate in-
creases?
8
I am convinced that most of the automobile insurance prob-
lems now confronting the United States derive from the federal-
state relationship established in the McCarran-Ferguson Act9 for
regulation of the insurance industry. This pattern of regulation
8 See generally Hearings on Insurance Industry, supra note 3 (testimony of
David Maxvell, Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner).
9 15 U.S.C. § 1011, et seq. (1945).
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had its origin and inception in 1944 as a result of the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v.
Southeastern Underwriters Association." This case originated in
1942 when the Department of Justice instituted an investigation
that resulted in a criminal indictment in Georgia against the
Southeastern Underwriters Association, twenty-seven of its of-
ficers, and one hundred ninety-eight member companies. Two
violations were charged, price fixing and agreement to monopolize.
The United States District Court, following precedent established
in 1868,11 dismissed the case on the ground that insurance business
was not commerce and thus was not subject to regulation under
the Sherman Antitrust Act.'2 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the supremacy of the power
of Congress to regulate insurance in the public interest in the
following terms:
Our basic responsibility in interpreting the Commerce
Clause is to make certain that the power to govern inter-
course among the states remains where the Constitution
placed it. That power, as held by this Court from the begin-
ning, is vested in the Congress, available to be exercised for
the national welfare as Congress shall deem necessary. No
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activi-
ties across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond
the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of in-
surance. 8
Immediately, the insurance industry and State commissioners
were presented with a decision. That decision was whether to
completely change existing practices or to obtain legislation in
the Congress negating the Court's decision. Actually, the decision
had been anticipated and legislation was, in fact, pending in Con-
gress when the decision was announced. Thus, to nullify the
Supreme Court's decision, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners immediately undertook action to obtain enact-
ment of that legislation and, as a result, on March 9, 1945, the
10 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
11Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
1251 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ga. 1943).
13 322 U.S. at 552-53.
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hurriedly and inadequately debated McCarran-Ferguson Act be-
came Public Law 15 of the 79th Congress.
In effect, the responsibility for insurance regulation was vested
in the states and by exempting the insurance industry from federal
antitrust jurisdiction, the Congress reestablished the legality of
the practices successfully challenged in the Southeastern Under-
writers case.
However, the effect of this monumental legislation on the
public interest was not immediately apparent. Congress was then
concerned with World War II; automobile transportation in war-
time 1944 was extremely limited. Cars were not being produced
and those pre-war vehicles available for civilian use were not
capable of the 300 horsepower of modem machinery. Similarly,
highway construction projects were limited to providing defense
and economic infrastructure. Thus accidents were at a minimum.
With the tremendous increase in America's dependence on auto-
motive transportation, however, the problems inherent in the Mc-
Carren-Ferguson Act of 1944 have become evident.
First, with all deference to the dedicated efforts of many State
commissioners, State governments generally have proved ill pre-
pared, incapable or unwilling to effectively regulate insurance in
the public interest.1 4 Under the McCarren-Ferguson Act's delega-
tion of supervisory authority, the several states have established
diverse systems of insurance regulation and licensing require-
ments.
However, with respect to ratemaking procedures, a majority
have adopted some form of the 1947 All Industry Commissioners
Model Bill drafted by the NAIC. Generally, this approach per-
mits individual companies or, alternatively, rating organizations
to file applications for rate increase for approval prior to taking
effect. The standard applied by the state supervisory authority is
whether rate increases are "excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
criminatory." Under this fragmented system of regulation, sepa-
rate determination of the "reasonableness" of rate increases by
individual state authorities has proved a vexatious and incon-
sistent procedure. Generally, the state insurance commissions have
been ill-equipped in terms of budgets, staffing and expertise to
1 4 STAF E PoRT, supra note 1, at 34-39.
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gather and analyze the data indicating the "reasonableness" of
premium increases.' 5 Largely this inability results because under
conditions of contemporary automotive transportation, rate reas-
sonableness depends on the nationwide profit and loss experience
of insurance companies, their internal corporate structure and
overhead, and the frequency and seriousness of interstate auto-
motive accidents. Certainly, the state commissions have been at a
disadvantage in dealing with centralized insurance rating bureaus
which employ specialized personnel and impressive nationwide
statistical intelligence and data gathering systems.' 6 Apart from
the inadequacies of state administrative and supervisory agencies,
in many states, state officials have proved unduly responsive to
the interests of the insurance industry and, for political reasons,
seem to have substituted cooperative arrangements for arm's-
length dealings.' 7 It has only been in recent years that public rate
increase hearings have been held and public defenders appointed
to cross-examine the experts,' 8 to present arguments against the
application, and to represent the public. In the words of the
House Judiciary Committee: "All these factors add up to in-
adequate protection to public interest and too great a reliance on
an industry that is all too willing to assist the processes of its own
regulation". 10
A second major defect of the McCarren-Ferguson Act is that
the blanket exemption of the insurance industry from federal
antitrust jurisdiction has permitted the automobile insurance in-
dustry to maximize profits without regard to the public interest.
20
Moreover, under exemption from the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
the industry has preferred to request rate increase through col-
laborative rating bureaus rather than on the basis of individual
competitive performance of companies. 21 Accounting methods
designed to indicate operational losses rather than the true
15 Id.
10 Id.
'7 Id.
Is New Jersey policyholders were represented by such counsel at rate making
hearings for the first time in 1967.
10 STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
2 0 See STAFF REPORT OF THE ANTI-TRUST SuBcomfm. OF HOUSE COM. ON
JUDICIARY, 90TM CONG., IST SESS., AuTOmOrn.E INSURANCE STUDY (1967).
21 King The Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1137 (1968).
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earnings picture and general marketing inefficiencies have also
been charged against some companies. 22 Further, insurance com-
panies have resisted any effort by State Commissioners to include
investment income from prepaid, unearned premium and claim
reserves in the consideration of rate increase applications.
23
It would, however, seem unfair to place the blame for defects
in the automobile insurance system solely with the private in-
surance industry and State regulatory structures. Industry con-
tentions that higher jury verdicts, more costly repair expenses,
and soaring hospitalization and physician costs contribute to the
problem seem well founded.24 Likewise, increased accident rates,
inadequate safety design of cars, and inadequate highway safety
engineering 25 undoubtedly provide contributing causes. Yet, de-
spite these higher costs and causes of increased claims, there ap-
pears to be no justification for the industry's performance or for
the ineffectiveness of present regulatory agencies. In short, reform
of the federal-state structures established pursuant to the McCar-
ren-Ferguson Act seems required to protect the public interest.
While many interested and knowledgable persons have ex-
pressed hope that the insurance industry will undertake voluntary
self-reform, federal legislation, in my judgment, is the only means
to correct existing defects. This conclusion is based on the in-
dustry's response to recent public outcry and its continued absorp-
tion with profits.
Rather than embark on a program of voluntary reform, the
industry seems to have relied on a massive public relations
campaign-a campaign designed to minimize public complaints,
to exaggerate valid industry problems, and to shift the blame for
abuses of the public away from the industry.
One widely publicized public relations device has been the
so-called non-cancellable policy. According to nationally circulated
advertisements, motorists are insured for a stated period (5 to 10
years) and are "guaranteed" against cancellation. However, most
of these policies do not protect against non-renewals at the end
22 Birkensha, Investment Income and Underwriting Profits: And Never the
Twain Shall Meet? 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rsv. 713 (1967).
23 Id.
24 Remarks by T. Lawrence Jones, President of the American Insurance As-
sociation on release of the Association's Special Committee Report on the Keeton-
O'Connell Plan, Oct. 21, 1968.
25 Id.
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of the policy term. None guarantee that premium rates will not
be raised to a prohibitive level.
A second response by major insurers has been to propose a
system of rate regulation which is theoretically based on "open
competition". 0 This would abolish the existing regulatory system
which requires insurers to justify rate increases prior to their be-
coming effective. It is argued that competition in an open market
will hold rates down and permit insurers to expand their markets.
In brief, the proposal is to remedy an inadequate regulatory
structure by completely turning over rate making to the insurance
industry. In my judgment, the tremendous importance of modem
insurance to the public and the industry's continued preoccupa-
tion with profits does not permit its regulation to be left to
existing market forces and practices. Moreover, in California
where this plan has been adopted, the public's experience with
rates and policy coverage has not been satisfactory. According to
data provided by the Association of California Consumers, rates
have soared since enactment and proportionately less premium
dollars are used to pay accident claims.2 7 It is also interesting to
note that California has found it necessary to enact a law regu-
lating policy cancellations.28 Moreover, the assigned risk popula-
tion has increased tremendously since adoption of the open
competition plan.
The recent situation in New Jersey is an example of the in-
dustry's unwillingness to participate in reform programs. In
February of 1968, after an unprecedented full public hearing, the
New Jersey Commissioner of Banking and Insurance denied ap-
plications for a 20.6 percent increase filed by the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters. The national significance of this deci-
sion is based on the factors taken into account by the Commis-
sioner in determining that insurance companies were making a
"reasonable" profit at present rates:
First, investment income on "unearned premium" and "loss
claims" reserves was considered.
26 Spewler, A Comparative Economic Analysis of Current Rate Regulatory
Laws, 1968 INs. L. J. 372. See also Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Anti-Trust and Monopoly, supra note 3, at 7548-82 (testimony of J. Victor Herd,
Chairman of the Boards of the Continental Insurance Companies).
27Hearings of the Senate Subcomm. on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, supra note
23, at 7571-76.
281 d.
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Secondly, profits on "excess limits" coverage beyond New
Jersey's basic coverage of $10,000, $20,000, $5,000 were included.
The response of the insurance industry to this far-reaching
decision was incredible. Indeed, it prompted the Deputy Com-
missioner of Insurance to describe the situation as follows: "The
insurance companies are determined to teach New Jersey a lesson
so that no other State Insurance Department will ever dare do
what New Jersey has done."-29 Principal techniques employed by
the industry's campaign were the widespread cancellations and
non-renewals of automobile and property coverage;30 agents' com-
missions throughout the state were cut; companies denied agents
binding authority on automobile coverage;31 and many companies
refused to write automobile coverage unless the applicant pur-
chased other lines of insurance such as life or commercial; 32 and
agency agreements were widely terminated.33
The industry's campaign in New Jersey also involved wide-
spread avoidance of the Commissioner's decision by a "consent to
rate" procedure. This consent to rate procedure is permitted
under a 1962 New Jersey law which principally sought to permit
motorists with bad driving records to obtain adequate coverage
rather than being forced into the assigned risk pool where maxi-
mum coverage limits are $10,000, $20,000 and $5,000. 34 Under
the procedure, such motorists can obtain any desired coverage with
private companies, but they must first sign that they are willing
to pay a higher premium. Subsequent to the rate making de-
29 Deputy Commissioner Horace Bryant, statement reported by Newark-Star
Ledger.
30 New Jersey Insurance Department officials received 2,500 complaints from
persons having their insurance cancelled during the six months subsequent to the
rate decision. Since prior experience indicates that the Department receives only
five percent of the total cancellation complaints, a figure of 50,000 cancellations
can be projected for this period.
81 A letter from Continental Insurance Companies to its agents, May 1, 1968,
directed as follows:
"It is required that you not bind us on any new private-passenger-auto-
mobile risk. . . after receipt of this letter .... You may submit ap-
plications without binders for new family automobile policies when we
are, in your judgment, the logical carrier because of other lines that we
now have for the applicant. ..
32 Id.
33 During 1966-1967, there were only 7,277 agency cancellations. However,
during the first six months of 1968, New Jersey officials reported 6,900 suct
cancellations.
34 NJ. STAT. ANNOT. § 17: 29A-7.1 (1962).
[Vol. 57,
]AuroOBmE LIAmrr INSUANwcE
cision, use of these procedures increased by approximately one
hundred percent.35
In advocating corrective federal legislation, it is not suggested
that the Federal Government should or will completely preempt
automobile insurance regulation. I am, however, convinced that
a more efficient, uniform, and less costly pattern of regulation
can be established through coordination or centralization at the
federal level. Such a regulatory pattern should include a minimum
amount of legislation along the lines of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation Act36 to insure against insolvencies of in-
surance companies, laws requiring minimum standards in regard
to capitalization and reserves with federal authority to make
certain they are maintained, laws spelling out bases for cancel-
lation and refusal to renew policies, and legislation eliminating
discrimination in relation to age, nationality, and color.
The writer believes that the McCarren-Ferguson Act should
be amended to extend federal antitrust jurisdiction to the auto-
mobile liability insurance industry. The arguments of the industry
that application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to the business
of insurance would result in destructive and excessive competition
do not appear substantial. Primarily, these arguments hold that
individual companies do not have sufficient experience on which
to base rates, and that such experience can only be gathered and
collaborated through rating bureaus.
However, in my judgment, the ability of large companies to
operate profitably on the basis of their own individual experience
has been amply demonstrated by the past and present successes of
aggressive independent companies. With respect to the smaller
companies, it would not be impossible to establish a publicly con-
trolled statistical bureau which could compute and make available
the necessary actuarial and loss experience data. Indeed, in the
Southeast Underwriters Association case, the Department of
Justice suggested precise guidelines for operation of rating bureaus
within a competitive framework.37 Each company would belong to
a privately operated statistical bureau. The activities of the
bureau, however, would be subject to public regulation and would
35 In 1967 there were only 25,051 approved "consent to rate" filings. How-
ever, during the first six months of 1968, the figure stood at 26,226.
36 12 U.S.C. § 1811, et seq. (1950).
37 See STAxF REPoRT, supra note 1, at 73.
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be limited to development of pure premium based on the com-
bined loss experience of all carriers.
Another priority area for reform is the congestion of court
calendars, especially in connection with the small claim. The
tremendous backlog of court calendars throughout the nation
provides persuasive evidence of the need to find some way of
expeditiously processing the thousands of claims which arise from
minor traffic accidents. This writer would urge careful investiga-
tion and analysis of a plan establishing a federal agency that
would compensate victims of automobile accidents regardless of
fault for their out-of-pocket expenses to a maximum of $2,500.00.3s
as Under the plan, claimants could recover for hospital, medical and drug
bills, loss of earnings and other out-of-pocket expenses to be specified in the
legislation. There would be no award for pain and suffering and, since most auto-
mobiles are covered by collision insurance, which currently provides adequate pro-
tection, property damage to automobiles would not be included.
While it appears that Congress has the power to take the automobile
accident problem out of the courts [The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411
(1966), and NLRtB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937)]
and proclaim an exclusive Federal administrative remedy insulated from judicial
review [Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943)],
such coercive action seems unnecessary. The anticipated superiority of the agency
relief should allow the plan to operate efficiently on a voluntary basis. Thus,
submission of a claim to the federal agency would be completely elective under
the plan and the claimant would lose no presently-held negligence recovery rights.
Rather, the agency would be established in addition to present court remedies
and would be given concurrent jurisdiction with the state and federal courts.
The determination of the agency would not be conclusive on the claimant.
No appeal would be provided for from the federal agency. hus, the claimant
could fake the award, which would foreclose him from any further proceedings, or
he could refuse the award and go to the state court. However, the converse would
not be true. A claimant disappointed in a state court by a judgment which is
res ludicata could not enter the federal forum.
An accident victim would therefore be confronted with a choice of
remedies. If his claim of injuries is minor, it is unlikely that he will choose the
state court system where recovery depends upon negligence, compliance with
rules of evidence and stringent proof as to damages. Rather, it is believed that
the many traffic victims with small claims who are now forced into the state court
system would choose the easier, quicker, surer and cheaper route to compensation.
Financing the plan would require careful investigation and development of
actuarial data and statistics in order to determine both the inial and operating
funds necessary. However, as demonstrated by the recent federl legislation with
respect to flood insurance, the cooperative efforts and resources of the Federal
Government and private industry would seem the best method of funding and
operation. Several methods recommend themselves for development of the
federal share of the costs. These include, inter alia, an annual federal tax on
motor vehicle registration, use of gasoline taxes, and other sources which further
dialogue might prove feasible.
Admittedly, there remain many questions with respect to the establishmentand the operation of such a plan. However, I would hope its presentation will atleast bring about further discussion and that it may have some contribution to
make in the ultimate solution of the overall problem. There remain too manyquestions, too many unknown variables, nd t o little objective data in the
present search for solution to this major social problem to suggest any definitive
solutions.
[ ol. 57,
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This would permit both state and federal court systems to
devote their attentions to the refined and deliberate process of
adversary trial in major causes of action where the plaintiff's
claims of pain and suffering and loss of future earnings require
such careful scrutiny.
As the nature of these proposals indicates, existing congres-
sional concern with the automobile insurance system is not
directed to legislation that would make insurance a public utility;
nor is there presently any major congressional support for abolish-
ment of tort negligence compensation doctrines. Certainly, results
of the ongoing study of these problems by the United States
Department of Transportation, scheduled for completion in 1970,
will spark renewed interest in no-fault plans. However, as pre-
viously indicated, I would anticipate that, in seeking corrective
measures, the Congress will be primarily concerned with practical
reforms along the lines suggested.
